THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

1891 · THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY · 1941

ROUND TABLE



A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

Dilemma in the Far East

ETER DRUCKER · NATHANIEL PEFFER · QUINCY WRIGHT

6th BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY · 154

FEBRUARY 23, 1941

The University of Chicago

ROUND TABLE

Published weekly. 10 cents a copy; five copies, 25 cents; half-year subscription, 26 issues, one dollar. Published by the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1939, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

No. 154

NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

DILEMMA IN THE FAR EAST

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

PETER DRUCKER, former financial editor, *Frankfurter Generalanzeiger*

QUINCY WRIGHT, Professor of International Law, University of Chicago

NATHANIEL PEFFER, Professor of International Relations, Columbia University

*A radio discussion broadcast from Radio City, New York, over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, February 23, 1941, at 2:30 P.M., Eastern Standard Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

DILEMMA IN THE FAR EAST

*

MR. WRIGHT: Gentlemen, the war has become one. Hitler is moving troops in Spain and Bulgaria, and Britain is moving troops in the Near East, and in the Far East toward Singapore. Japan is moving south.[1]

MR. DRUCKER: So we can no longer talk about the war in Europe and the war in the Far East, but only about one war—*the* war.[2]

MR. PEFFER: At any rate the Japanese are moving down on Singapore from two or three directions; Great Britain is landing an expedition in Singapore; the United States is sending planes to the Pacific,[3] and taking strong diplomatic positions. We have a concrete situation, requiring concrete choices.

---

[1] *Last week German soldiers—mainly "pioneer" and "sapper" units, plus some field ambulances and field kitchens—went into Santander, Spain, ostensibly to aid in the relief of that city following a disastrous storm. At the same time, German staff officers appeared in Sofia, Bulgaria, and it was announced the British forces at Singapore had been reinforced with Australian troops.*

[2] *The war in Asia, the so-called "China Incident," began in July, 1937; the war in Europe began seventeen months ago with the German invasion of Poland, September 1, 1939.*

[3] *Newspapers reported (February 21, 1941) that General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, told the Senate Military Affairs Committee*

MR. DRUCKER: How near are the Japanese to Singapore?

MR. WRIGHT: About 700 miles, I think, at the present time.[4]

MR. DRUCKER: Is that all?

MR. PEFFER: Roughly.

MR. WRIGHT: How important is it to the United States and to other countries that the Japanese be prevented from taking Singapore?

MR. DRUCKER: How would a Japanese conquest of Singapore affect the strategic position of this country?

MR. WRIGHT: It would certainly be very important from the point of view of Philippine defense. It would also be very important from the point of view of American sources of tin and oil and rubber in the Malaysian area.[5]



MR. PEFFER: Don't you think all those factors are relatively unimportant? In the immediate situation

---

that both army and navy aircraft were to be sent to the Pacific to strengthen American air power in the event any serious trouble should develop.

[4] *The Spratly Islands, occupied two years ago by Japan, lie some 600 miles northeast of Singapore. The islands were annexed in March, 1939, by the Japanese, after the French had claimed ownership in 1933. The islands are seven in number and cover some 250 acres—mainly coral reef. They have no great commercial value but might be useful as air or naval bases. For a general orientation of the geographic situation in the Pacific, see the map on this page.*

[5] *Efforts are now being made to develop tin smelters in this country,*

Singapore is important to the United States because its fall would make more likely a victory of the Japanese-German allies, which has certain consequences.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, I suppose you refer to its direct effect upon the Chinese war and indirectly upon the position of Russia?

MR. PEFFER: Not on the Chinese war. That would be indirect. I am thinking wholly of the world-balance which might follow from a Japanese-German victory.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, but the status of Chinese defenses affects the world-balance.

MR. DRUCKER: I would like to be very concrete and specific and ask you what would be the effect of a Japanese conquest of Singapore upon the battle of Britain, if any? I do not know.

MR. WRIGHT: It would have a very important effect in preventing supplies from Australia and New Zealand going across the Indian Ocean.

MR. DRUCKER: But if you bind major American and British forces in Singapore, are you not depriving Europe of supplies and men, planes, and ships which would be needed to ward off Hitler? After all, it is Hitler we are fighting, and Japan is just a jackal.

MR. WRIGHT: That is a relative question. If Britain sent too many of her ships to the Far East, she could not use them to defend Britain and the Mediterranean. But, on the other hand, using a certain portion of her fleet to defend Singapore would be advantageous.

---

using Bolivian ore, and several plants are now in operation producing artificial rubber. In addition, Brazilian plantings of rubber are being expanded in the hope that eventually the United States may be able to obtain sufficient raw rubber stocks in this hemisphere. Rubber trees take seven years to mature.

MR. DRUCKER: To be concrete, would you advocate that Britain ship 300,000 or 400,000 Australians, who are free (now that Mussolini has lost in Libya),[6] to Singapore or to Turkey, where Hitler's next blow may fall?

MR. WRIGHT: Certainly not from Tripoli.

I think it is very wise to send troops, new troops coming from Australia to Singapore, as has been done.[7]

MR. PEFFER: Let's be careful about getting adrift in drawing-room strategy. It is very tempting and very easy, and you cannot prove anything.

You cannot talk in terms of England alone. What you have to ask is: What happens if the British deflect part of their strength to the Far East to stop Japan? What happens if America deflects part of its strength to the Far East to stop Japan? Should we do so? Why, and when?

MR. WRIGHT: I agree with you that it is a relative question. In my judgment, the American contribution to the war, the *one* war, is primarily in American factories, and in the Far East. We can make our great contribution there.

MR. PEFFER: What do you mean by "contribution" in the Far East? What should we do now?

MR. WRIGHT: Maintain such forces there that Japan will not go to Singapore.

---

[6] *The British advance from Sidi Barrani in Egypt, into Libya, has so far reached El Agheila, but is still considerably short of Tripoli.*

[7] *On February 18 it was announced that an Australian force "many thousands strong" had reached Singapore to reinforce the British, Indian, and Malay forces now stationed there under Sir Robert Brooke-Popham.*

MR. DRUCKER: And to what extent has the American policy during the last six months or two years been working toward that end?

MR. WRIGHT: It has been working too slowly in that direction. We have maintained a policy which has kept Japan guessing, but at the same time Japan has felt from a number of things we have done that we did not really mean business.

MR. DRUCKER: Would you say that last June Japan could have gotten into Singapore when Britain was confused and bewildered?[8]

MR. WRIGHT: I think she had an opportunity then—a better opportunity than she has now. Of course, it takes time to strike.

MR. PEFFER: I should say that Japan was caught off-balance by the quick German victory, and couldn't gather herself in time.

MR. DRUCKER: Yes.

MR. PEFFER: After that, by September, it seemed already too late because Japan was not sure that Great Britain was going to be defeated.[9]

In the interval, Japan has been uncertain because she does not know what America is going to do. We come back always to what America is going to do.

MR. DRUCKER: And would Japan strike if this country were ready to go to war over Singapore, or is Japan bluffing?

---

[8] *That is, at the time of the invasion of the Low Countries and France by Germany, the evacuation of Dunkirk by the British Expeditionary Force, and the capitulation of France on June 22.*

[9] *For a discussion of the signing of the three-power pact in September, 1940, and an evaluation of the meaning of this pact, see the* ROUND TABLE *broadcast of September 29, 1940, referred to in the list of suggested readings on page 24.*

MR. PEFFER: I am a little afraid of the word "bluff." Whether it will strike or not is a matter of guess. It can be kept from striking, I should say, only if sufficient fear can now be instilled.

MR. WRIGHT: The word "bluff" is also a very relative one. In my judgment Japan is anxious to avoid a war with the United States. She will assume certain risks. If, however, she is convinced that an attack upon Singapore would mean war with the United States, she will not make that attack.

MR. PEFFER: You are much too sure, Wright.

If we take any action, it must be with full recognition that it involves great risks of war. Therefore, there must be calculation whether the situation requires sufficient risk. Don't be too overconfident of Japan's bluffing.

MR. DRUCKER: Both of you are far too academic for me. What, concretely, would you do? I do not understand what you have in mind.

MR. WRIGHT: I would implement the licensing system which we enacted last June.

MR. DRUCKER: What does that mean?

MR. WRIGHT: The licensing system was an authorization to the President to prevent exports of war material going to Japan. It is true it was intended as a measure of conservation, and there has been some licensing; but, in fact, there was more trade in war materials going from the United States to Japan last Fall than during the preceding Fall.[10]

MR. PEFFER: That is water over the dam. It is too late for all that. Too late.

MR. DRUCKER: What must we do now?

---

[10] *See the pictograph on page 14.*

MR. PEFFER: Now you must make up your mind. Are you willing to tell the Japanese to stop because if they do not stop you will send the fleet?

MR. DRUCKER: Now look here! If you were to address a mass meeting, and were to make specific proposals, what would you suggest? I still do not know.

MR. PEFFER: I would suggest that the British stiffen up Singapore's defenses.

MR. DRUCKER: They are doing it.

MR. PEFFER: At the same time, the United States should at least begin to send planes. The only hope of avoiding one of two things, namely, the occupation of Singapore by Japan or a war with Japan, is such immediate strong action that Japan might be frightened off. Would you agree with that, Wright?

MR. WRIGHT: I agree. I think it is very important that we take this strong action, because that is the most important step to avoid war; but I want to add this: Japan will not think we mean business as long as we allow war materials to be sold to her.[11] Japan takes that action as stronger evidence that we do not really mean business.

MR. PEFFER: No, Japan will take only one kind of action seriously: indication that the fleet might move.

I am afraid all these things are rather remote. You are talking

---

[11] *On September 26, 1940, President Roosevelt issued an order to the effect that "the exportation of all grades of iron and steel scrap will be placed under the licensing system. Under the new regulations which will be made effective on October 16, 1940, licenses will be issued to permit shipments to the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only." The New York Times estimated at that time that Japan bought 91 per cent of her scrap steel and iron from the United States.*

DEFENSE OF THE INDIES

now in terms, either in Europe or in Asia, of naked power quickly used.

MR. WRIGHT: Would you strip the decks for action?

MR. PEFFER: I would not, unless absolutely necessary. I regret the situation has arisen. I do not think it should have arisen. Since it has arisen I think our best hope is to avoid a conflict by frightening the Japanese, if possible. I repeat, I do not know whether it is possible.

MR. DRUCKER: There is a definite risk of war.

MR. PEFFER: There is a definite risk of war. You agree, Wright?

MR. WRIGHT: Let's agree, then, that any steps we can take to convince the Japanese that we are not going to allow them, peacefully, to take Singapore are important steps in avoiding war.

MR. DRUCKER: Don't you think that by concentrating superior forces at Singapore you play the Axis' game? After all, I must repeat, the major enemy is Hitler and not Japan; and isn't a Far Eastern war precisely what Hitler wants?

MR. WRIGHT: I am thinking of avoiding a war with Japan. In my judgment a strong policy is the way to avoid war with Japan.

MR. DRUCKER: But you would bind major forces in the Far East—such as tanks and planes—which might conceivably be used to defend Britain?

MR. WRIGHT: Those major forces would only be necessary in the Atlantic in case Hitler had already won and destroyed the British Fleet. The British Fleet can still, fortunately, handle the Atlantic situation.

MR. PEFFER: We are in a terrible dilemma. The mistake lies in having let that dilemma arise. The dilemma is this: The war and even the future of Singapore is going to be determined not in Malay waters but in the Atlantic.

MR. DRUCKER: I agree with you 100 per cent. To me the threat to the Dardanelles and the threat to Gibraltar are more important and infinitely more dangerous than any Japanese threat, just as Hitler's attack on Great Britain is infinitely more important than anything that Mussolini might do. And you must convince me that by taking a strong stand in the Far East you are not going to weaken European defenses.

MR. PEFFER: Talk bluntly, Drucker. Then, concretely, we have to think of all these things in terms of concrete action in the next few days. Would you let the Japanese go into Singapore?

MR. DRUCKER: I do not know what effect it would have on Europe. You take the stand it would not be decisive. Wright thinks it would be. If it is decisive, we cannot afford to let Singapore go by the boards. Britain seems to agree.

MR. WRIGHT: I agree with your relative position, but I ask you this: Would an embargo action or the sending of a fleet by the United States to the Far East weaken the Dardanelles' situation in any way? After all, nobody is talking of the United States sending warships to the Dardanelles.

MR. DRUCKER: No, but as you said, this war may be won by American factories, and it may be lost if those factories do not produce primarily for Europe. I mean that I do not know; I am confused; I am bewildered.

MR. WRIGHT: I want our factories to continue to produce for Europe, and that is where most of their products are going. I think some of these goods can well be sent to help China.

MR. PEFFER: Drucker is afraid that if we get into a war with Japan we will stop making things for Great Britain.

MR. DRUCKER: We cannot sit back and say "This is a sit-down war which we are going to fight by long-distance telephone." I am afraid that if it becomes a war it is going to become a real war and not just an armchair strategist's daydream.

MR. WRIGHT: But you have to remember this: If Japan takes Singapore she will also move into the Dutch East Indies and probably into the Philippines. We would then be involved in war whether we wanted it or not.

MR. DRUCKER: You believe Singapore is decisive in the European war; Peffer does not. And if you do not believe that Singapore is decisive, how can you justify the risk of a major war for something which is not decisive? My disagreement is only with Peffer.

MR. WRIGHT: Good.

MR. PEFFER: The trouble with you, Drucker, is that you are being logical, and you cannot be logical on top of a volcano. On pure logic, I say again it would have been better if this issue had never arisen, and if the Western powers had been reconciled to letting happen what will in the East and concentrating on the West; but the fact is, it *has* arisen.

Now you have three forces moving. Our only hope now, if we want to avoid a war—we concede a war is unfortunate—is to frighten off one side that may get us into fighting. What we have to do is find some skilful formula whereby we can manage to frighten off Japan, without having to fight. I repeat, I do not know whether it can be done.

MR. DRUCKER: I still maintain that we should not overlook things happening in Europe. We should not overlook that from Hitler's point of view it does not matter who owns Singapore, but it matters a great deal who is in possession of the Dardanelles, which would open up the way to the iron reserves Hitler needs and which would force Russia into a definite, cast-iron alliance with Germany. We should not forget that.

MR. WRIGHT: Do you think that Hitler's taking the Dardanelles would force Russia into such an alliance?

MR. DRUCKER: Yes, I think I would go even further: I think that Japan's taking Singapore would force Russia into an alliance with Japan, and Hitler's going over into Asia by way of the Darda-

nelles would force Russia, too. I think that both of you are not paying enough attention to the fact that Russia today is the one major power still outside the war.

MR. WRIGHT: I agree with you that Russia is of considerable importance, but I expect Russia to make every effort to remain neutral as long as she can. In my judgment, Singapore and the Dardanelles are parallel with each other in influence on Russia. Russia is an Asiatic power.

MR. DRUCKER: I would agree with you. I know that many years ago, when Germans were first mapping out the war plans, they had a bitter fight over whether it would be possible to win the war without defeating Great Britain. There was then and is now a faction in Germany which says that if an enemy occupies Singapore and the Dardanelles Great Britain is defeated, without having been defeated in Great Britain.

MR. WRIGHT: Is that position a dominant one now? That is rather surprising to me because I had thought the dominant belief in Germany was that they must win the battle of Britain, either by blockade or aerial bombing.

MR. DRUCKER: I would consider that the one and only sensible position, but it is certainly true that a strong part of the party associated with Göring and the air force does not believe that they must defeat Britain.

MR. PEFFER: Coming back to the bearing of the fate of Singapore on the war in Europe . . . .

MR. DRUCKER: I disagree with you, Peffer. I believe that Singapore is a decisive factor in the European situation. I agree with Wright that you cannot let it go because its effects on Europe would be far too important.

TRENDS IN U.S. EXPORTS TO JAPAN

DATA ON CHIEF ITEMS FROM DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE



MR. WRIGHT: If it is true that the dominant party in Germany is the one which thinks that the war can be won—

MR. DRUCKER: *One* party.

MR. WRIGHT: —by knocking the props out of the British blockade at Singapore, Gibraltar, Suez, and the Dardanelles, then Singapore assumes tremendous importance.

MR. DRUCKER: I think it *is* of tremendous importance.

I think that the one reproach I have to make against both of you is that neither of you takes sufficiently serious the fact that if the Axis coordinates its war, the war against the Axis must be made one war, too.

MR. PEFFER: But look! What are you saying? On the one hand, you have fairly well demonstrated that if there should be a war in the East it works in the interest of the European partner of the Axis. Then again, when I ask you, "Would you let Singapore go?" (since you have to make concrete choices, remember), then you say it is too related to Europe and cannot be let go. In other words, are we in a position where without wanting to, and unfortunate as it may be, we simply *have* to take measures in the East which react to Hitler's advantage? Is that what you are saying?

MR. DRUCKER: No. I think we have to take measures in the East, but we must take very great care that they do not react to Hitler's advantage.

MR. WRIGHT: Let me state my position, Drucker. I am convinced that this war is one. That is what we started out with. I do not mean "w-o-n"; I mean "o-n-e"—that there is just one war.

MR. DRUCKER: And it will be won—w-o-n.

MR. WRIGHT: That means that the various agencies in this war must each make their contribution at the point where they can do so most successfully.

The United States can make its contribution in factories and at Singapore. Great Britain can make its contribution at . . . .

MR. DRUCKER: That is the sensible point of view. I agree with that. But Peffer does not quite know what the question is.

MR. PEFFER: You see, I have the highest respect for the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE, but it does not ever settle anything. You cannot discuss these questions as if you were discussing them at a round table. You have said we have to do those things which are most effective. But if you were in Washington and had to make the decision, you could not get away with that; you would have to say, "I will do one, two, three."

Now I am asking you both to say what action will you take, if any? Will you let Singapore go? If not, what action? Wright says strong action; you say as much as we can without helping the Axis. Now exactly what do you mean?

MR. DRUCKER: Well, I really hoped to find out from you because you know the Far East so well. I agree with you, Wright, that we have to take strong action. (Besides, it is past our agreeing—strong action *is* being taken.) So, what will be the effect? That is my question.

MR. WRIGHT: You said at one point, Drucker, that Russia was a decisive factor here. I want you to develop that a little more. What do you think Russia is going to do?

MR. DRUCKER: I do not know. I think Russia will try to stay neutral if possible. Ever since 1930, I think, the Russian game can be explained by this desire. Certainly all my contacts with Russian diplomats and Russian newspapermen have shown they have one desire only—keep out, stay out, and be strong enough. . . .

MR. WRIGHT: Yes!

MR. DRUCKER: . . . . to pick up a few pieces when one side cracks.

MR. PEFFER: Which won't be affected one way or another by what happens in Singapore.

MR. DRUCKER: I disagree with you, because if Japan takes Singapore then I feel Russia will be forced to make an alliance.

MR. WRIGHT: I look upon the Chinese effort as a matter of major importance. As long as Japan has a million men fighting the Chinese she cannot send a force to attack Russia. She cannot easily send a force to attack Singapore. Thus China, in my judgment, is very important.

MR. PEFFER: Oh, Wright, I wish I could get as much comfort as you do. The fact that she has a million men tied up in China will not keep Japan from moving on Singapore. It is moving on Singapore now.

MR. DRUCKER: But how strong are the forces?

MR. PEFFER: That is to be determined. There are two questions: Will there be a war? Can we win it? We are still talking about whether there will be one. I am not saying that Japan would necessarily be strong enough to win. She is strong enough to take Singapore if she wants to, unless another side stops her.

MR. WRIGHT: You would agree that as long as these million men are tied up on the Chinese front that Japan is not going to make any effort to take Siberia?

MR. PEFFER: That might be true.

MR. DRUCKER: Siberia is quite a large order.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes; but suppose these million men were released; wouldn't Russia immediately feel very grave anxiety?

MR. PEFFER: There is not a chance of those million men being released within the next week. The concrete situation we must face now is what precisely should be done; and that will not be affected one way or the other by a million men in China.

MR. WRIGHT: We agree the million men cannot be released in any immediate period of time. I think we also should agree that retaining Singapore is very important in retaining these million men on the Chinese front.

MR. DRUCKER: I do not think that Peffer disagrees with you on that. I think that while he regrets what has happened, he thinks that it has happened and cannot be undone. So, I still do not quite know what you two want to have done. That was my opening question, and I have not yet received an answer.

MR. WRIGHT: Haven't I made my position clear? I want a full embargo. I want to send ships over there. I think that will keep us out of the war. If it doesn't, I am willing to take the risk of getting into war with Japan.

MR. PEFFER: All right, but don't wriggle out, Wright.

MR. DRUCKER: I think we are all doing quite a bit of wriggling.

MR. PEFFER: First, you say you do not think it will get us into war. First ask yourself, are you willing to go to war on this score?

MR. WRIGHT: Let me put it this way: We are less likely to get into war than if we do nothing. The trouble with the United States has been its inertia. We have not taken a positive stand one way or another. As a result, Japan has been creeping down toward the Philippines. Pretty soon she will think she can creep into the Philippines.

MR. PEFFER: Wright, your history is bad.

MR. DRUCKER: Don't get into a discussion of history.

MR. WRIGHT: Do you deny that she has been creeping down toward American possessions, toward Singapore?

MR. PEFFER: The only reason Japan has crept rather than jumped is the fact that America was undeterminable.

MR. WRIGHT: I deny that.

MR. PEFFER: And because the United States' fleet was in Pearl Harbor.

MR. DRUCKER: So you would definitely say that the American policy has been successful on the whole, would you?

MR. PEFFER: It has been successful on the whole. It has at least kept Japan from attacking Singapore up to February 23, 1941.

MR. WRIGHT: But it has encouraged Japan to keep on creeping.

MR. PEFFER: If you were to go to Washington and ask Admiral Nomura how encouraged he has been . . . .

MR. WRIGHT: He talks as though he is considerably encouraged. He thinks there is every chance of complete friendship with the United States. He thinks there is a chance of keeping up complete trade with the United States.

MR. DRUCKER: Well, the poor man has a job to keep; don't be too hard on him.

You think, Peffer, that American policy on the whole has been successful, but that now is the time to change from a policy of indetermination, of indecision, of letting Japan guess what way the American cat will jump.

MR. PEFFER: The situation is now beyond control. The situation now is such, I think, that in the immediate future the Japanese

will go down to Singapore unless they are frightened off by the threat of war or stopped by war. I think it would be tragic if there were a war. The only recourse I can see is to try to frighten them off. Concretely, therefore, I should tell them *privately*, not publicly so as to humiliate them, "Don't go any farther."

MR. DRUCKER: You know there are 10,000,000 listeners to the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE.

MR. WRIGHT: What is going to happen this spring in the battle of Britain? Is Germany going to make an all-out air attack upon Britain? In other words, are the various issues at the Dardanelles and Gibraltar and Singapore merely side issues, merely feints, or can we look upon them as being the major action and upon the battle of Britain as having been, for the time being, abandoned?

MR. DRUCKER: I think that you cannot assume that the battle of Britain is abandoned. On the other hand, you cannot rest in peace by assuming that threats against the key points of British sea power, Gibraltar, the Dardanelles, Singapore, are just feints. I think you must assume that Hitler has not yet made up his mind which way to jump, and will jump the way which seems the easiest.

MR. WRIGHT: In other words, there are two factions in Germany?

MR. DRUCKER: Yes. The Göring faction and the Hitler faction.

MR. WRIGHT: And Hitler has not yet decided which of those factions he is going to support?

MR. DRUCKER: Yes, I would say so. Therefore, you cannot say that the threat against Singapore is a feint or a bluff. You must take it seriously. You cannot say that the battle of Britain has been called off because it may not have been called off.

MR. WRIGHT: I agree with you entirely on that.

I think we recognize that the war can only be lost or won by defeat or victory for Great Britain, although there is some difference of opinion as to how that is to be achieved. The battle is primarily in Europe, but it depends upon American factories and upon what happens in the Near East and in the Far East. The loss of Singapore would not contribute decisively to a British defeat, but it would be a very important loss to Britain. The situation has developed (on this I think we are all in agreement), so that the United States can make an important contribution by standing firmly with Great Britain against the Japanese advance in Singapore. In my judgment, at least, a strong stand of that kind would be the best way to avoid war and to stop this steady creep of Japan toward American possessions in the Philippines and American sources of raw materials in the Dutch East Indies. We should, therefore, make a strong stand.

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. Concentrations of Japanese military forces have approached within what distance of the British base of Singapore? Page 3.
2. Name two ways in which a Japanese occupation of Singapore might affect American Pacific interests. Page 3.
3. What relationship between the European war and Japanese southward expansion is suggested by Mr. Peffer? Page 6.
4. How would an extension of the "licensing system" by the State Department affect Japanese aggression? Page 7.
5. What action on the part of the United States is suggested as the only possible way of stopping a Japanese attack on Singapore? What risks would it involve? Page 8.
6. What areas in Europe are comparable to Singapore in strategic importance in the opinion of Mr. Drucker? Page 10.
7. The seizure of Singapore is a logical step toward the conquest of what rich economic area? Page 11.
8. The seizure of either the Dardanelles or Singapore by one of the Axis partners would have what effects upon the position of the Soviet Union? Pages 12–13.
9. The Japanese army in China is estimated to be how large? Page 17.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 24.

*

1. Discuss the advisability of adopting any or all of the following proposed courses of action:
   a) Sending the United States fleet, or a large portion of it, into Far Eastern waters.
   b) Sending a part of the United States fleet to join the British at Singapore.
   c) Imposing a complete embargo upon trade with Japan.
   d) Loaning further money to China.
   e) Sending arms and munitions to China without charge.
   f) Attempting to negotiate an "understanding" with Russia for mutual action against Japan.
   g) Withdrawing our forces from the far Pacific and announcing our aim to be the defense only of the Pacific on this side of an Alaska-Hawaii-Panama Canal Zone line.
   h) Declaring war on Japan.
2. "The war in the Orient will be settled in Europe; therefore we should concentrate all attention upon the European arena and act there before we act in the Pacific." Discuss this statement pro and con.
3. Do you agree with the thesis that the European and Asiatic wars are one? If so, what changes in American foreign policy would you suggest?
4. What do you believe are the American interests, if any, menaced by Japan's southward expansion in the Orient?

SUGGESTED READINGS

BISSON, T. A., *American Policy in the Far East, 1931–1940.* New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939. *A summary of the United States' position in the Far East since the invasion of Manchuria in 1931.*

GIDEONSE, HARRY; PEFFER, NATHANIEL; and UTLEY, CLIFTON M., *Crisis in the East.* A University of Chicago ROUND TABLE broadcast, September 29, 1940, *discussing the significance of the three-power German-Italian-Japanese pact.*

KIRALFY, ALEXANDER, "The Dilemma of the Kremlin," *Asia*, March, 1941. *A discussion of Russia's position between "the New Order in Europe" and "the New Order in Asia."*

PEFFER, NATHANIEL, *Must We Fight in Asia?* New York: Harper & Bros., 1935. *An evaluation of the theory that war in the Orient is inevitable.*

———, "America's Two Ocean Dilemma," *Asia*, July, 1940. *American naval policy in the face of dangers in both the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans.*

PRATT, FLETCHER, "What Can We Defend?" *New Republic*, February 24, 1941. *America's strategic problems in two oceans analyzed and discussed from the naval expert's viewpoint.*

SMITH, ROBERT A., "Stalemate in the Pacific," *Asia*, February, 1941. *Present causes of conflict between Japan and the United States and some speculation on the unlikely possibility of these causes of conflict being resolved.*

SNOW, EDGAR, *The Battle for Asia.* New York: Random House, 1941. *An experienced war correspondent's analysis of the present situation in Asia and the Pacific, with special attention to the part the United States has played, and will play, in the "battle for Asia."*

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain interesting and illuminating sidelights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcast discussion of "Guns or Butter?" February 16, 1941.*

*

High Time

That "battle" presented over the air this afternoon—I believe we were told it was a ROUND TABLE discussion—by some more "experts," no doubt—well truly, it sounded just like three furriers standing on the sidewalk on Seventh Avenue, New York City, during lunch hour—deciding what to "do" with Hitler. . . . .

It's high time so-called experts, commentators, and all those telling us about what we already know about the nice part of democracy—start to think more of America and less of other nations in this world. Charity begins at home.

Gullible, New York

*

Thanks

For many weeks I have listened to your program with great interest. It is not only entertaining but educational, and I wish to express my sincerest thanks to all who are responsible for this excellent broadcast and I hope it will continue for a long time to come.

R. K., Washington

I Do Not Like . . . .

I have never commented on your ROUND TABLE discussions before, but the program yesterday irked me terribly. I considered the discussion one of the poorest I have ever heard.

I did not like the remark by one of the party something to the effect that "we did not have enough capable executives, workers, etc., to turn out consumptive goods along with war materials." It certainly made me feel that some of these men do not have much confidence in us as Americans, for there are many capable people looking for such jobs if they only had a chance. There is no confidence today.

In another part of the discussion the suggestion of turning implements and other tools into war materials was made. You would think we were right in the midst of war to hear some of these promoters, and have to use hoes and shovels to fight with.

I do not like all this war propaganda, and it would be better if some of these men would talk on something more constructive for the good old U.S.A. instead of destructive.

I am much more worried about conditions today within our own country than about those of foreign nations, and think it is high time some corrective measures are taken.

G. M. D., Wisconsin

DUMBFOUNDED, AMAZED, AND DISGUSTED THAT NOT ONE OF THE BRILLIANT GROUP ON YOUR PROGRAM TODAY BROUGHT OUT THE FACT THAT THE FIRST THING TO BE DONE TO SPEED VITAL AND NECESSARY DEFENSE PRODUCTION WOULD BE TO WIPE OUT ALL STRIKES AT ONCE AND INCREASE THE FORTY-HOUR WEEK TO FIFTY OR SIXTY HOURS FOR THE THREE TO SIX MONTHS' CRITICAL PERIOD; THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE PROPOSED CHANGE-OVER COULD BE GOING ON AT TOP SPEED AND THE DESIRED RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED. . . . .

H. J. M., Illinois

The University of Chicago Round Table audience, according to latest estimates, is larger than the combined audiences of the next two ranking discussion broadcasts.

ROUND TABLE SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

Please send the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE for:

☐ One Year ($2.00) ☐ Six Months ($1.00)

Name.....

Address.....

City.....State.....

☐ I am enclosing the correct amount

☐ Please send me a bill

FOREIGN: ONE YEAR, $3.00; SIX MONTHS, $1.50

TRANSCRIPT SUBSCRIPTIONS

ONE YEAR'S SUBSCRIPTION.....$2.00 SIX MONTHS'.....$1.00

FOR SINGLE COPIES OF THE BROADCASTS LISTED BELOW SEND TEN CENTS IN COIN TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. ANY FIVE PAST OR FUTURE BROADCASTS, 25 CENTS.

Nos.

1939

56. *Hitler's Economic Motives*
57. *"Room to Live!" Population Pressure and Aggression*
60. *Refugees*
61. *If Europe Paid Its Debts*
63. *What Do You Mean—Americanism?*
64. *Russia and Europe*
65. *Freedom and the Economic System*
66. *The Place of Radio in a Democracy*
67. *Questions on Democracy*
68. *Our Liberties Today*
69. *Crisis in the Orient*
71. *Out of School—Out of Jobs*
74. *Is the Consumer Getting His Nickel's Worth?*
79. *The High Cost of Living*
82. *Prosperity vs. Boom*
83. *International Law—What Is It?*
84. *The Economic War*
85. *What's the War All About?*
86. *Testing Public Opinion*
87. *After the Next Armistice—What?*
88. *Taxes*
91. *Can Capitalism Survive the War?*
92. *Government and Business*
93. *When Tomorrow Comes*
94. *1939: Crisis Year*

1940

95. *Wages and Hours in the North and South*
98. *The Jews*
100. *Is Russia Losing in Finland?*
101. *Tariff Walls*
102. *War Myths*
104. *Is America's Economic Frontier Closed?*
105. *Must the World Unite?*
106. *Can We Protect America?*
108. *The Archbishops Look at America*
109. *Scandinavia on the Spot*

Nos.

111. *Where's that War Boom?*
112. *The Trojan Horse*
113. *Blitzkrieg, May, 1940*
114. *America and the Peacemongers*
115. *Babies Cost Money*
117. *Have We Time to Think?*
118. *Italy Marches.* June 16, 1940
119. *America's Capacity to Arm*
120. *Economic Union for the Americas*
121. *Civil Liberties and the Fifth Column*
122. *M-Day and America*
124. *Should America Conscript Men Now?*
125. *The New France*
126. *What Really Happened at Havana?*
128. *Blitzkrieg on Britain.*
129. *Should America Aid Britain?*
130. *Should America Feed Europe?*
131. *Can Germany Conquer Latin America?*
132. *Conscript Wealth, Too?*
134. *Will Hitler Attack America Next?*
135. *YOU, Soldier*
136. *The Balkans Aflame*
137. *Warmongers and Appeasers*
138. *Polls and the Election*
140. *World Revolution*
141. *Art and Our Warring World*
142. *The Soviet Union and America*
143. *Is Hitler Revolutionizing Britain?*
144. *Where Are Those 50,000 Planes?*
146. *1951: The Next Decade in Education*

1941

147. *More Aid to Britain Now?*
148. *Is This Our War?*
149. *Morale: First Line of Defense?*
150. *Can Capitalism Defend America?*
151. *The Last Ten Years*
152. *Can the Americas Be Invaded?*
153. *Guns or Butter?* February 16

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE HAS THE LARGEST NETWORK OF ANY EDUCATIONAL DISCUSSION BROADCAST. THE FOLLOWING STATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY CARRY THE PROGRAM EACH SUNDAY:

2:30 P.M. EASTERN STANDARD TIME

City	*Call Letters*	*Kilocycles*	*City*	*Call Letters*	*Kilocycles*
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1440	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	780
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1310	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1370	Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	740	New York, N.Y	WEAF	660
Baltimore, Md.	WFBR	1270	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	780
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1230	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1020
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	900	Pittsburgh, Pa.	WCAE	1220
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1210	Portland, Me.	WCSH	940
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1210	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	890
Cincinnati, Ohio	WSAI	1330	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1070	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1350
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1150
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1380	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1310
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	920	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	790
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1200	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1310
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1270	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	620
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1300	Toledo, O.	WSPD	1340
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	900	Washington, D.C.	WRC	950
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1370	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1120
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1310	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	1310
Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1210	Zanesville, Ohio	WHIZ	1210

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL STANDARD TIME

Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	930	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1500
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1500	Minneapolis and		
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1460
Duluth, Minn., and			New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1320
Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1290	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	900
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1310	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	630	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	790
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	940	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1310
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1370	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1420
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1370	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1270	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1450
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1110
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1370	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1230
Laurel, Miss.	WAML	1310	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1200
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	890	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1140
Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	940	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1210
Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1280			

12:30 P.M. MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1180	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	780	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	900
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1350	Safford, Ariz.	KGLV	1420
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1420	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1290
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1340	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1260
Denver, Colo.	KOA	830	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1240
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1210	Yuma, Arizona	KYUM	1210

11:30 A.M. PACIFIC STANDARD TIME

Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	920
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1410	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION

Honolulu, T.H.	KGU	750	
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1210	7:00 P.M. E.S.T.
Amarillo, Texas	KGNC (Monday)	1410	8:30 P.M. C.S.T.

HOW TO FIGHT NAZI PROPAGANDA

•

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

•

MARCH 2, 1941

•

MAYNARD C. KRUEGER, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Chicago

CLYDE MILLER, Executive Secretary, Institute for Propaganda Analysis

W. LLOYD WARNER, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology, University of Chicago

•

SUGGESTED READINGS

GRAY, L. C., "America's Ears," *Current History,* January 10, 1941.

HOLWAY, C. P., "Fight Fire with Fire," *Nation,* January 11, 1941.

LAVINE, HAROLD, and WECHSLER, JAMES, *War Propaganda and the United States.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940.

ROLO, C. J., "Radio War on the U.S.A.," *American Mercury,* January, 1941.

TAYLOR, EDMOND, *The Strategy of Terror.* New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1940.

PRINTED IN U.S.A.